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This paper examines the phenomenon of the over-
supply of teachers but shortage of qualified teachers in 
Indonesia. Using a theoretical framework of government-
dominated market with government-set wage rate and 
demand for teachers, the analysis explores how teacher 
supply, particularly the composition of the teaching force 
with low or high qualification, would be determined 
by current and future public policies. Using 2001 to 
2008 Indonesian Labor Force Survey data, the paper 
further estimates the potential effect of the most recent 
teacher law, which could give college educated teachers 
a significant pay increase, on the composition of the 
Indonesian teaching force with differentiated education 
backgrounds. Using a sample of workers with college 
education, the author finds that the relative wage rate of 
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teachers and that of alternative occupations significantly 
influence the decision of college educated workers to 
become teachers. It is also found that the wage rate 
set by the most recent teacher law would increase the 
share of teachers approximately from 16 to 30 percent 
of the college-educated labor force. This increase that is 
due to the new government-set wage rate, would result 
in a pupil-teacher ratio of 24 to 25 pupils per teacher 
with college education, but will require a more than 
31 percent increase in the wage bill for teacher salaries. 
The empirical approach of this paper is derived from a 
structural model that takes into account the endogeneity 
of the wage rate and corrects for sample-selection bias 
due to occupational choice. 
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I. Introduction and literature review 
  Teachers are not only a major determinant of student learning, but also absorb a 
large amount of public resources.  The supply of teachers has attracted much attention in 
academic research as well as in public policy debate.  Dolton (2006) gave a 
comprehensive review of the existing empirical work on teacher supply issues, including 
entering teaching as the first job, staying in teaching, changing jobs and exiting teaching, 
and re-entering teaching.  A majority of the existing literature on teacher supply is on 
developed countries, such as the  US and the  UK, where teacher supply issues have 
received a high level of attention, matched with rich micro and time-series data.  One 
major research area is the determinants of the choice for teaching as an occupation, and 
particularly  the effects  of the differentiated earnings of teaching  and non-teacher 
occupations. 
Manski (1985)’s early work examined the relationship between academic ability, 
earnings, and the decision to become a teacher through analysis of data from a national 
sample of college graduates in the US.  He found that the frequency of choice of teaching 
as an occupation is inversely related to academic ability. In the meantime, the earnings of 
teachers tend to rise only slightly, if at all, with academic ability. An econometric 
analysis suggests that in the absence of a minimum ability standard, increases in teacher 
earnings would yield substantial growth in the size of the teaching force but minimal 
improvement in the average academic ability of teachers. The average ability of the 
teaching force can be improved and the size of the teaching force maintained if minimum 
ability standards are combined with sufficient salary increases. 3 
 
Flyer and Rosen (1997) examined the effects of the rising labor force participation 
of women on both demand for and supply of teachers.  They concluded that in the US, 
the rising demand for teachers during the past few decades is attributable to the growing 
market opportunities for women and thus higher demand for a market substitute for home 
schooling.  Widened occupational choice for women has also attracted women away from 
the traditionally female dominated occupations.  Nonetheless, the flexibility of teaching 
and less wage penalty for temporary leaves remain important attractions for women to 
work in teaching jobs during their productive years.  
Using the US longitudinal survey of the High School Class of 1972, Van der 
Klaauw (1997) estimated a dynamic utility model of occupational choice and 
occupational mobility, accounting for first and subsequent occupation choice.  He found 
that teacher salaries and opportunity wages are important determinants of the supply and 
retention of teachers.  Csellack (2002) also used a dynamic structural model and panel 
data (NLSY 1979, US) looking into teacher occupational choice.  The simulation results 
show that a 2 percent increase in teachers’ wages increases teacher supply by 2.6 percent.  
Hanushek and Pace (1995), on the other hand, find that in the US, participation in 
teacher training is not significantly affected by relative teacher earnings.  In addition, 
teacher candidates perform lower on tests than other graduates,  and teacher training 
completion is lowered by state requirements for courses and teacher tests.   
  Using UK data, Dolton (1990) and Dolton and Chung (2004) focused on looking 
into the problem of recruiting graduates into the teaching profession and retaining them 
in  the  UK. Dolton (1990) found that relative earnings in teaching and non-teaching 
occupations and the corresponding growth in earnings in these two choices have a 4 
 
marked effect on graduates’ choices.  In particular, the lower are the relative wages or 
wage growth in teaching, the less likely is a graduate to choose that  career.  These 
earning effects operate on initial choices and choices made later in an individual’s career.  
Dolton and Chung (2004) compared the earnings of qualified teachers who choose to 
teach with the opportunity wage for those who do not teach. They find that the rate of 
return on career choice for teachers has been declining for both men and women over the 
past 25 years although teaching is still relatively well paid for women.  
  There are also a few studies on the earnings effect on the aggregated teacher labor 
market.  Thomas (1975) uses UK time series data between 1962 and 1970, and finds 
significant salary effects suggesting a 1 percent fall in relative starting salaries will 
induce a 2-5 percent fall in the relative supply of male graduates entering teaching and 
similar effects for average salaries of teachers.  Effects for female graduates are up to 
twice as big.  Zabalza, Turnbull and Williams (1979) also used UK time series, and 
estimated that the elasticity of graduate new entrants with respect to wage equals 2.4-3.9 
for men and 0.3-1.8 for women; and that with respect to relative starting wages, it is 3.4 
for men and 2.8 for women.  Court et al. (1995) updated the time-series study in the UK, 
extending the study period to 1986-1992.  The salary effect is still strong, suggesting that 
a 1 percent fall in relative starting salaries will induce a 4 percent fall in the relative 
supply of graduates entering teaching.   
  One recent study outside the US and UK is by Ortega (2006).  Using Venezuelan 
data, his results suggest that the teacher wage premium and wage dispersion have little 
effect on the quality mix of applicants to teaching. Most students’ preference for teaching 5 
 
is unresponsive to wage levels relative to other occupations and to wage growth prospects 
within teaching. 
 
II. Indonesian context 
The overall teacher supply seems sufficient in Indonesia, with the pupil-teacher 
ratio declining steadily in recent years (Figure 1).  The current pupil-teacher ratio is 
estimated at 19:1 for the primary level and 13:1 for the secondary level.  These ratios 
clearly indicate that at an aggregated level, Indonesia does not have teacher shortage 
issues, unlike some other countries in the region, such as the Philippines or Cambodia.  
As a matter of fact, its pupil-teacher ratios are close to those of some developed countries 
such as Japan (20:1 at primary level, 13:1 at secondary level), or the US (15:1 at primary 
level and secondary level)
2
   
.  Based on a school survey, the World Bank (2007) reports 
that a large proportion of Indonesian schools has an over-supply of teachers even 
according to the existing generous staffing norm.  The report further points out that there 
is some space to improve the efficiency of the staffing norm.  Based on the recommended 
formula, nearly 85 percent of the schools are over-staffed. 
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Figure 1: Pupil-Teacher Ratio in Indonesia: 2001-2006 
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However, in recent years, concern with the composition of the teaching force has 
been more prominent, particularly with the general recognition that learning outcomes are 
influenced by the ability of teachers who guide the learning process. There is an often 
expressed dissatisfaction with the distribution of ability within the present teaching force, 
with the public sentiment that public policies should induce desirable changes.  With this 
line of thought, teachers’ minimum qualification, in terms of educational attainment, has 
been raised several times during the past decade, even though there is little consensus on 
whether educational attainment is a good measure of “ability” relevant for teachers.  
The most significant policy change in teacher employment is the latest Teacher 
Law (UU14/2005) passed in 2005.  It caught much attention with the 100 percent teacher salary 
increase for certified teachers.  One of the key requirements for certification is four or more years 
of college education (S1 or D4).  The Ministry of Education set the goal that by 2015, the whole 
teaching force should be comprised of only certified teachers.  The magnitude of the potential 
change will be large given that a large proportion of incumbent teachers are below the minimum 
qualification level (Table 1).  For example, by early 2006, over 80 percent of the primary school 
teachers were without college education. Given that there are nearly 2.7 million teachers in 7 
 
Indonesia, and about half of them are primary school teachers, this translates to a large number of 
teachers that need to be upgraded or replaced.  
Table 1: Number and percentage of teachers below required qualification before 
and after the new teacher law 
  Primary  Junior 
 secondary 
Senior 
secondary 
Minimum qualification starting in 
2005 
4-year degree 
or diploma 
4-year degree or 
diploma  4-year degree 
% of teachers below min. qualification  82%  33%  13% 
       
Minimum qualification before 2005  2-year diploma  3-year diploma  4-year degree 
% of total teachers below min. 
qualification  33%  15%  13% 
 
While the Ministry of Education is carrying out a massive upgrading program 
with recognition of prior experience for incumbent teachers, whether the law will be 
successful in the longer run depends foremost on how it would influence the occupational 
choice decision of college-educated workers.  Until now, there has been no basis for 
making such forecasts. In the absence of empirical analysis, we can only guess at the 
impact of changes in teacher salaries on the composition of the teaching force.  
Under a theoretical framework with a government-dominated market with a 
government-set wage rate and demand for teachers, this paper explores how teacher 
supply, particularly the resulting composition of the teaching force with low or high 
qualification, would be determined by current and future public policies.  Using 2001 to 
2008 Indonesian Labor Force Survey (SAKERNAS) data, this paper further estimates the 
potential effect of the latest teacher law, which gives high qualification teachers a 
significant pay increase, on the composition of the Indonesian teaching force with 
differentiated education backgrounds.  
 8 
 
III. Theoretical framework: Aggregate teacher labor market 
Following Zabalza, Turnbull, and Williams (1979), the labor market for teachers 
can be thought of within a traditional supply and demand framework, with the additional 
complication that the government is virtually the sole hirer of labor.  The demand for 
teachers can be determined by the number of children in the country of school age, and 
the government’s desired pupil–teacher ratio. For a given such ratio, the demand for 
teachers is therefore a constant, denoted by q∗ in Figure 2.  Under the reasonable 
assumption that the supply of teachers with college education is a positive function of 
average teacher earnings, an upward-sloping labor supply schedule can be drawn as S. In 
a perfectly competitive market, a teacher wage of w∗ would therefore clear this labor 
market. 
Figure 2: The labor market for teachers 
 
W 
Q1  q*  Q2 
S 
D 
w* 9 
 
However, the teachers’ labor market is of course not competitive, and the 
government, in its role as (almost) exclusive purchaser of teaching labor, has other 
considerations, prime among which is the level of expenditure on teachers’ salaries in 
total. For a given level of such expenditure, an inverse relationship can be plotted 
between teachers’ earnings and the number of teachers hired, labeled D in Figure 2. If the 
government wants to raise the salaries of teachers, it can afford to hire fewer of them, 
given a fixed budget.   
Another complication added to the model is that teacher salaries do not adjust 
freely, as a majority of the teachers are civil servants, and therefore in most cases, their 
salaries follow a country’s civil servant remuneration scale.   
Figure 2 illustrates a general case of how an aggregated teacher labor market 
would work. With a mostly fixed wage rate W, the government can afford to hire Q2 
teachers at this salary level.  However, the market supply of teachers with college 
education at this salary level could be only Q1.  Therefore the government can hire (Q2-
Q1) low qualification teachers. Q2 can be higher than what is the actual need for teachers 
q*, as in this case, and therefore over-supply of total number of teachers, measured as 
(Q2-q*), can co-exist with the shortage of teachers with college education, measured as 
(q*-Q1).  This seems to explain the situation in Indonesia.  Among all teachers Q2, the 
proportion of qualified teachers is thus (Q1/Q2), while that of under-qualified teachers is 
(Q2-Q1)/Q2.   
On the other hand, if the government wants to hire all needed teachers (q*) with 
college education, the wage rate then needs to be set at w*.  However (q*, w*) could be 
above the fiscal capacity. This case is illustrated in Figure 3: the government would have 10 
 
the choice of either hiring only q0 college-educated teachers, or lower the wage rate to W’ 
to meet the demand for teacher numbers but with lowered average qualifications, with 
Q1’ teachers with college education, and (q*-Q1’) teachers under qualified. 
 
Figure 3: Labor market for teachers: low public budget  
 
  The other scenario is that (q*, w*) is below the fiscal constraint line D, as 
illustrated in Figure 4.  In this case, increasing the teacher salary level to w* would 
reduce the total excess of teachers, retain the right number of teachers with college 
education, as well as save public resources.  However, in reality, if this is the case, there 
would usually be an upward pressure to further raise teacher salaries beyond the 
necessary level, or hiring more teachers, until the total budget allocation is spent.  These 
can be illustrated by the move upward of teacher salary from w* to w’’, or hiring q*’ 
teachers rather than q*. 
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Figure 4: Labor market for teachers: high public budget  
 
For public policies that aim at inducing changes in aggregated teacher profile by 
changing teacher remuneration, key information is needed on the slope of S, and the level 
of w* that can induce the desired level q*.  
 
IV. Estimating teacher supply 
  The econometric model that this paper uses is based on Dolton (1990), which 
modifies that of Zabalza et al. (1979) and Willis and Rosen (1979), and considers that 
there are two possible outcomes to a college graduate’s decision.  The graduate can either 
decide to become a teacher (a) or not (na).  It is assumed that the earnings streams in 
these two regimes may be parameterized by a simple geometric process.  In this model, 
decisions are considered from the perspective of life-cycle earnings.  
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  Consider an individual chooses to enter teaching at time T then the present value 
of his expected earnings stream is: 
( ) ( ) . exp
1
dt rt t W V
T
a a ∫
∞






−  


 


−
=
ρ
ρ
                                      (1) 
  The maximum present value of earnings, chosen over alternative occupations is: 
( ) ( ) , exp ;
1
dt rt s t W Max V
T
na
s
na ∫
∞






−  


 

 −
=
ρ
ρ
                        (2) 
Where: 
) (t W is earnings at time t; 
ρ is “propensity to teach”;  
s is the choice set of other occupations.  
  We further define the earnings profile for teachers from time T and onwards is:  
( ) ( ) [ ] ∞ ≤ < − = t T if T t g W t W
a a
T
a exp .                                     (3) 
  Similarly, define earnings profile for non-teachers as: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ] ∞ ≤ < − = t T if T t s g s W s t W
na na
T
na exp , ,                       (4) 
where: 
WT is the earnings at period T, and g is earnings growth rate.  
Individual chooses not to go to teaching if V
na>V
a.  Defining I=ln(V
na/V
a), and 
plugging equation (3) and (4) into (1) and (2) would give: 
( ) ( )
a na a
T
na
T i g r g r W W I − + − − −  


 


−
− +  


 

 −
= ln ln ln
1
ln ln
1
ln 1 ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
.             (5) 
A linear approximation of equation (5) can be written as: 13 
 
( ) β ρ δ δ δ δ δ X g g W W I
na a a
T
na
T + + + + − + = 4 3 2 1 0 ln ln ,                                   (6) 
which is able to be estimated empirically.  
This teacher supply framework has various drawbacks when applied to empirical 
work.  One obvious limitation is that earnings data are rarely available across any 
appreciable time span in the life cycle.  This poses problems for meaningful econometric 
analysis. This means that little can be said about life cycle earnings without some 
assumption concerning earnings growth. In addition, even though panel data can provide 
a few observations per individual at different points of time, the existing panel data sets 
in Indonesia (i.e. three waves of “Indonesia Family Life Survey”) do not have large 
enough samples for teachers, particularly of teachers with college education.  In this 
paper, we use labor force survey data for a few consecutive years and control for year-
specific fixed-effects in earnings estimation for teachers and non-teachers. 
The second limitation of the model is that the non-pecuniary rewards of teaching, 
or the individual’s “propensity to teach,” cannot be directly measured.  Females with 
children may have higher propensity to become a teacher given that teaching is usually a 
more flexible job, and has less wage penalty when temporary leave happens (Flyer and 
Sherwin 1997).  Dolton (1990) used the probability of having the first job as a teacher as 
a proxy for propensity to teaching when estimating occupation change between teacher 
and non-teacher at later stages of one’s career.  However, this requires panel or historical 
data that is not easily available for the intended analysis.  Even under this approach, equal 
non-pecuniary rewards to jobs were assumed for prior entry into any job any individual 
has.  In this paper we include variables such as dummy for female, marital status, 14 
 
household size  in an attempt to capture the  variations in individual’s preference for 
teaching.  
The third key empirical difficulty is obviously the problem of how to estimate the 
foregone earnings in other occupations that influence an individual’s occupational 
decision, as one can only observe the earnings in the occupation that has been chosen. To 
solve this issue, we follow Dolton (1990)’s empirical approach involving 3-stages of 
estimation.   
We need to estimate two earnings functions for teachers and non-teachers: 
1 1 ln u X W
a + = β , and                                            (7)  
2 2 ln u X W
na + = β .                                                 (8) 
Obviously, people are not randomly selected into teachers and non-teachers.  OLS 
estimates would be  biased.  Sample selection bias can be corrected by starting with 
estimating a probit model of being a teacher:   
( ) ε γ + = Z a I ,                                                           (9) 
where I equals 1 if an individual is a teacher, and 0 otherwise. Z includes all exogenous 
variables.  
  The second stage estimates the log earnings function for teachers and non-
teachers (eq. 7 and 8), by inserting Mill’s ratio (λ ) on the right-hand side.  For teacher 
and non-teacher sub-samples, the consistent estimates can be obtained by OLS estimates 
of the following:  
1 1 1 1 1 ln ξ λ ρ σ β + + = X W
a , and  
2 2 2 2 2 ln ξ λ ρ σ β + + = X W
na . 
where 15 
 
( )
( ) ε
ε
σ γ
σ γ φ
λ
/
/
1 Z
Z
Φ
− = , 
( )
( ) ε
ε
σ γ
σ γ φ
λ
/ 1
/
2 Z
Z
Φ −
= , 
( ) 1 1 var u = σ , 
( ) 2 2 var u = σ , 
( ) 1 1 ,u corr ε ρ = , 
( ) 2 2 ,u corr ε ρ = . 
These first and second stages can also be estimated using maximum likelihood 
based on conditional distributions of earnings for teachers and non-teachers.  The 
likelihood function of teacher earnings is  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) γ
β φ
γ ε γ ε ε γ
Z
X W
Z u f Z u f Z u f
a
Φ
−
= < = − > = > +
1
1 1 1
ln
| | 0 | . 
The likelihood function for non-teacher earnings is: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) γ
β φ
γ ε ε γ
Z
X W
Z u f Z u f
na
Φ −
−
= − < = < +
1
ln
| 0 |
2
2 2  
With consistent estimates of  1 β  and  2 β , we use predicted values of W
a and W
na 
for each individual to estimate the structural model of the following:  
( ) η δ δ δ + + − + = Z W W I
a
T
na
T 2 1 0 ˆ ln ˆ ln                        (10) 
   
V. Data and results 
We use the 2001-2008 Indonesia Labor Force Survey (SAKERNAS) to look into 
the occupational choice of working cohorts with college education.  Our sample includes 
40,019 workers with college education from year 2001 to 2008.  Overall, only around 3% 16 
 
of the 20-year old and above population are able to attain this level of education.  The 
proportion increases overtime, but at very slow pace between 2001 and 2008 (Table 2).  
Table 2 also shows that teaching job is a prominent choice for college graduates.  
Between 2001 and 2008, around one-fifth to a quarter of the college graduates are 
teachers.  
Table 2: Composition of labor force with college education 
Year 
non-
teacher  teacher  Total 
% with college 
education  
among population 
age 20 and above 
2001  2,414  333  2,747  3.0% 
2002  3,729  687  4,416  2.7% 
2003  4,750  846  5,596  3.1% 
2004  4,979  982  5,961  3.3% 
2005  3,411  911  4,322  2.8% 
2006  4,363  972  5,335  3.2% 
2007  4,683  954  5,637  3.3% 
2008  5,160  845  6,005  3.6% 
         
Total  33,489  6,530  40,019  3.1% 
 
Figure 5 depicts the trend of relative earnings for teacher and non-teacher college 
graduates by age group.  Earnings of teachers have been below that of non-teachers in for 
the past few years.  However, the real earnings gap is narrowing. Teacher’s real earnings 
growth has been faster than that of non-teachers in recent years.  A closer look reveals 
that teacher’s real earnings has been mostly constant over the years, while it is non-
teacher’s earnings that has actually been eroded by inflation over time.  
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Figure 5: Log real earnings of teachers and non-teachers with college 
education in Indonesia, by age group, 2002-2008 
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Figure 6 shows the trend of relative earnings (ratio) of teachers, and the share of 
labor force with college education that are teachers.  Between 2001 and 2005, the share 
of college graduates shows an growing trend, reaching over a quarter of total workers 
with college education.  Between 2005 and 2008, this trend seems to experience a reverse.  
By 2008, the share of college graduates on the labor market and who are teaching came 
back down to 19 percent.   
For college graduates, even though the premium of non-teaching job is eroding 
over time, there were periods that show a reversed trend, such as between 2005 and 2008.  18 
 
The earnings ratio of non-teachers to teachers increased slightly from 1.1 to 1.3.  More of 
interest is the negative correlation between the pay-off of non-teaching job and the share 
of college graduates in teaching (Figure 7).  The correlation  is  -0.83, and highly 
significant (P=0.01).   
Figure 6: Trend of relative earnings and share of college graduates in 
teaching, 2001-2008 
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  Source: SAKERNAS.  
Figure 7: Relative earnings vs. share of college graduates in teaching, 2001-2008 
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
Wnt/Wt
%
 
o
f
 
c
o
l
l
e
g
e
 
g
r
a
d
 
i
n
 
t
e
a
c
h
i
n
g
 19 
 
 
Now we turn to individual level data and estimate the effect of earnings 
differentials on the occupation choice of teachers versus non teachers, using the empirical 
framework laid out in the previous section.  Table 3 is the descriptive sample statistics.  
Table 3: Sample summary statistics: 
 
Variable 
name  Definition  Mean  Standard 
error 
Dependant 
variables: 
 
     
Dteacher  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual is a teacher  0.163  0.370 
Earnings  Monthly earnings in Rupiah (Rp)  1,262,190  2,038,909 
lnW  Log earnings, =ln(Earnings)  14.106  0.757 
 
Explanator
y variables: 
     
Age  age  37.173  10.183 
Dfemale  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual is female  0.396  0.489 
Drural  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in rural area  0.153  0.360 
Dmarried  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual is married  0.725  0.447 
D2001  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual is from 2001 sample  0.069  0.253 
D2002  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual is from 2002 sample  0.110  0.313 
D2003  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual is from 2003 sample  0.140  0.347 
D2004  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual is from 2004 sample  0.149  0.356 
D2005  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual is from 2005 sample  0.108  0.310 
D2006  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual is from 2006 sample  0.133  0.340 
D2007  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual is from 2007 sample  0.141  0.348 
D2008  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual is from 2008 sample  0.150  0.357 
D11 
0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Nanggroe Aceh 
Darusalam  0.026  0.158 
D12  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Sumatera Utara  0.037  0.190 
D13  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Sumatera barat  0.028  0.165 
D14  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Riau  0.017  0.128 
D15  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Jambi  0.011  0.103 
D16  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Sumatera selatan  0.017  0.131 
D17  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Bengkulu  0.014  0.116 
D18  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Lampung  0.014  0.116 
D19  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Bangka belitung  0.005  0.070 
D21  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Kepulauan Riau  0.006  0.079 
D31  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in DKI Jakarta  0.228  0.419 
D32  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Jawa Barat  0.073  0.261 
D33  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Jawa Tengah  0.066  0.248 
D34  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in DI Yogyakarta  0.060  0.237 
D35  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Jawa Timur  0.113  0.317 20 
 
Variable 
name  Definition  Mean  Standard 
error 
D36  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Banten  0.024  0.152 
D51  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Bali  0.039  0.193 
D52 
0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Nusa Tenggara 
Barat  0.020  0.140 
D53 
0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Nusa Tenggara 
Timur  0.014  0.119 
D61 
0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Kalimantan 
Barat  0.015  0.120 
D62 
0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in kalimantan 
Tengah  0.011  0.105 
D63 
0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in kalimantan 
Selatan  0.019  0.138 
D64 
0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Kalimantan 
Timur  0.017  0.130 
D71  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Sulawesi Utara  0.015  0.121 
D72  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Sulawesi tengah  0.015  0.120 
D73  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Sulawesi Selatan  0.035  0.184 
D74 
0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Sulawesi 
tenggara  0.017  0.127 
D75  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Gorontalo  0.007  0.082 
D76  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Sulawesi barat  0.003  0.058 
D81  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Maluku  0.013  0.112 
D82  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Maluku Utara  0.007  0.081 
D91  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Papua barat  0.004  0.065 
D94  0-1 dummy variable, =1 if individual lives in Papua'  0.011  0.106 
 
The sample includes the labor force with college education between 2001 and 
2008.  There are 40,019 observations in our sample, among which about 40 percent are 
female, and 16.3 percent are primary or secondary school teachers.   
The results of the maximum likelihood estimates for college-educated teacher and 
non-teacher log earnings functions, corrected for self-selection, are presented in Table 4.  
The result shows that for teachers, controlled for age, there are no significant earnings 
differentials between urban and rural areas, or between male and female teachers.  As 
mentioned in the previous section, this may reflect the fact that in Indonesia, a majority 
of teachers are civil servants, and follow standard pay scales.  
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Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimates of Log Earnings function for 
teachers and non-teachers 
 
 
Teachers log earnings 
  
Non-teachers log earnings 
LnWt  LnWnt 
Independent 
variable  Coefficient     Standard 
error     Coefficient     Standard 
error 
               
Constant  9.516  ***      (0.141)    12.114  ***      (0.071) 
Age  0.153  ***      (0.006)    0.078  ***      (0.003) 
 Age
2  -0.001  ***      (0.000)    -0.001  ***      (0.000) 
Dfemale  -0.010        (0.016)    -0.023  *      (0.012) 
 Drural  0.024        (0.021)    -0.119  ***      (0.017) 
  D2002  0.021        (0.039)    0.066  **      (0.025) 
  D2003  0.225  ***      (0.037)    0.265  ***      (0.023) 
  D2004  0.162  ***      (0.037)    0.331  ***      (0.023) 
  D2005  0.229  ***      (0.037)    0.291  ***      (0.025) 
  D2006  0.300  ***      (0.037)    0.416  ***      (0.024) 
  D2007  0.368  ***      (0.037)    0.511  ***      (0.024) 
  D2008  0.405  ***      (0.037)    0.538  ***      (0.024) 
               
               
  Censored obs  =  33,489    Censored obs  =  6,530 
 
Uncensored 
obs  =  6,530 
  Uncensored 
obs  =  20,934 
               
  Wald 
2 χ  (11)  =  3,228.82    Wald 
2 χ  (11)  =  3,937.5 
   Prob > 
2 χ   =  0.000     Prob > 
2 χ   =  0.000 
               
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
For workers in non-teaching jobs, however, there are significant earnings 
differentials.  Equally college-educated, a worker in rural areas earns 12 percent less.  
Woman also earns less than man.  Even though the earnings differential between man and 
woman is small (2 percent), it is statistically significant.   22 
 
In addition, the earnings growth rate, as measured by the coefficient estimates on 
Age, appears to be higher for teachers than for non-teachers: 15 percent per year for 
teachers as compared with 7.8 percent for non-teachers.  However, a teacher’s earnings 
peak at age 54, while a non-teacher’s at age 62.  This is possibly due to the mandatory 
retirement age at 55 for civil servant teachers.  
Table 5 presents the structural and reduced form estimates of occupational choice, 
equation (9) and (10) respectively.  To avoid relying solely on the non-linearity of the 
functional forms for identification, excluded variables need to be identified for the 
earnings function, and the structural function of the occupational choice.  The province 
dummy variables are used for estimating the occupational choice function, but excluded 
from the earnings function.  The argument could be that localized demand for teachers, 
due to various enrollment rates influence by local household socioeconomic conditions, 
can affect the likelihood of entering teaching profession, but not teacher earnings.  On the 
other hand, the dummy variables for various years are included in the earnings function 
estimation to capture overall labor market shifts in labor costs from year to year, but are 
excluded from the structural estimates for occupational choice assuming the year-to-year 
labor market change only affects individual’s choice through changing earnings 
differentials. 
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Table 5: Probit of choosing teaching by college graduates 
 
   Reduced form     Structural form 
Independent 
variable 
Marginal 
effect    
Standard 
error 
   Marginal 
effect    
Standard 
error 
               
Age  0.002  ***      (0.000)         
lnWnt_lnWt          -0.295  ***      (0.013) 
Dmarried*  0.054  ***      (0.004)    0.023  ***      (0.005) 
 Dfemale*  0.084  ***      (0.004)    0.083  ***      (0.004) 
  Drural*  0.175  ***      (0.006)    0.117  ***      (0.006) 
     D11*  0.023  *      (0.013)    0.024  *      (0.013) 
     D12*  0.001        (0.011)    0.000        (0.011) 
     D13*  -0.014        (0.011)    -0.015        (0.011) 
     D14*  -0.014        (0.014)    -0.013        (0.014) 
     D15*  0.046  **      (0.020)    0.047  **      (0.020) 
     D16*  0.008        (0.015)    0.008        (0.015) 
     D17*  0.043  **      (0.018)    0.044  ***      (0.018) 
     D18*  0.030  *      (0.017)    0.027  *      (0.017) 
     D19*  0.047  *      (0.029)    0.055  **      (0.030) 
     D21*  0.012        (0.025)    0.011        (0.025) 
     D31*  -0.081  ***      (0.006)    -0.075  ***      (0.006) 
     D33*  0.094  ***      (0.012)    0.094  ***      (0.012) 
     D34*  0.000        (0.010)    0.004        (0.010) 
     D35*  0.052  ***      (0.009)    0.051  ***      (0.009) 
     D36*  0.009        (0.014)    0.004        (0.013) 
     D51*  -0.012        (0.010)    -0.013        (0.010) 
     D52*  0.114  ***      (0.018)    0.113  ***      (0.018) 
     D53*  0.035  **      (0.017)    0.027  *      (0.017) 
     D61*  0.022        (0.017)    0.024        (0.017) 
     D62*  -0.021        (0.017)    -0.020        (0.017) 
     D63*  -0.013        (0.013)    -0.008        (0.014) 
     D64*  -0.012        (0.014)    -0.012        (0.014) 
     D71*  -0.030  **      (0.013)    -0.033  **      (0.013) 
     D72*  0.020        (0.016)    0.022        (0.016) 
     D73*  -0.018        (0.010)    -0.016        (0.010) 
     D74*  -0.005        (0.014)    -0.002        (0.014) 
     D75*  0.008        (0.022)    0.007        (0.029) 
     D76*  0.016        (0.030)    0.007        (0.022) 
     D81*  -0.006        (0.016)    -0.008        (0.016) 
     D82*  0.013        (0.024)    0.011        (0.023) 
     D91*  -0.039        (0.024)    -0.050  *      (0.022) 
     D94*  -0.049  ***      (0.014)    -0.050  ***      (0.014) 24 
 
   Reduced form     Structural form 
Independent 
variable 
Marginal 
effect    
Standard 
error 
   Marginal 
effect    
Standard 
error 
   D2002*  0.016  *      (0.010)         
   D2003*  0.043  ***      (0.010)         
   D2004*  0.042  ***      (0.010)         
   D2005*  0.054  ***      (0.011)         
   D2006*  0.023  **      (0.009)         
   D2007*  0.008        (0.009)         
   D2008*  -0.019  **      (0.008)         
               
  Number of obs  =  40,019    Number of obs  =  40,019 
  LR:
2 χ (43)  =  3,103.83    LR:
2 χ  (36)  =  3,329.76 
  Prob > 
2 χ   =  0    Prob > 
2 χ   =  0 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
  The primary focus for the occupational choice model is the coefficient on the 
earnings differential variable (lnWnt - lnWt), holding constant the other explanatory 
variables relating to various background and personal characteristics. A negative and 
significant coefficient on earnings differential variable would indicate that a college-
educated worker is less likely to choose teaching as profession if other occupations pay 
better.  Our estimate result shows the “right” sign and a high significance level.  Several 
other clear effects are notable in predicting whether in teaching profession or not.  Being 
a woman or being married is significantly correlated with being in teaching force.  It also 
appears that the predominant job for a college-educated worker in rural area is teaching.  
The likelihood of being a teacher is 11 percentage points higher for a college graduate in 
a rural area than that in an urban area. 
Based on the empirical results, double the salary of teachers with college 
education would result in an increase in the probability of college graduates choice of 
entering teaching force.  The marginal effect would be: 25 
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This would increase the proportion of college graduates choosing teaching 
profession to about one-third.  Using the population projection by BPS (Bureau of 
statistics), and assuming constant proportion of population above age twenty with college 
education, this would lead to about 24-25 pupils per teacher with college education. This 
level of pupil-teacher ratio is higher than the current level, but still falls within the 
adequate range compared with other countries in the region.   
Assuming this can be an acceptable pupil-teacher ratio such as q* in Figure 3, it 
still requires increased amount of public resources.  With increased pupil-teacher ratio 
from 16:1 to 24:1, but doubled teacher remuneration, the per-pupil cost would increase 
33 percent.  Without this commitment, there will be either teacher shortage, or a mix of 
teachers with high and low education background will continue to exist. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Aiming at attracting high caliber human resources into teaching, the latest 
Teacher Law (UU14/2005) in Indonesia promises a 100 percent teacher salary increase 
for certified teachers with a minimum 4-year college education or above.  In the long run, 
whether the law will be successful in attracting the needed college-educated labor force 
into teaching depends foremost on how it would influence their occupational choice 
decision.  Until now, there has been no basis for making such forecasts.  The findings of 
this paper provide some empirical foundations for the latest teacher law in Indonesia. 26 
 
This paper has analyzed Indonesian teachers’ labor supply under a theoretical 
framework that is based on a government-dominated market with government-set wage 
rate and demand for teachers.  This framework could explain the phenomenon of the 
overall over-supply of teachers but shortage of qualified teachers in Indonesia.  The 
results from the structural estimates constructed under the framework are particularly 
useful for looking into the impact of the latest teacher law on the future education profile 
of Indonesian teaching force.   
Using a sample of workers with college education in the Indonesian Labor Force 
Survey, this paper has found that the relative wage rate of teachers and that of the 
alternative occupations significantly influence college educated workers’ decision of 
becoming teachers in Indonesia. The large-scale pay increase promised by the law for 
teachers with college education will have a significant effect on attracting a college-
educated labor force to join the teaching force. It is estimated that the wage rate set in the 
latest teacher law will be able to increase the share of teachers approximately from 16 
percent to 30 percent of the college-educated labor force.  In addition, the new 
government-set wage rate can sustain a pupil-teacher ratio of 24-25 pupils per teacher 
with college education, but will require a more than 30 percent increase in the teacher 
salary bill. 
Finally, we conclude by highlighting that attracting a high caliber labor force into 
teaching is from the quality concern in the first place.  Even though there is general 
recognition that learning outcomes and education quality are influenced by the ability of 
teachers who guide the learning process, whether qualification in terms of educational 
attainment is an appropriate measure for teaching ability is debatable.  Even though there 27 
 
is established literature on the positive sorting of ability and educational attainment 
(Willis and Rosen 1979), the ability to be a good teacher may also be different from 
general academic ability.  Furthermore, getting the right people to teach is only the vey 
first step in improving educational quality and learning outcomes.  How to make these 
right people perform well and achieve results is an even a bigger challenge.   
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